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DISCOVERY PROVISIONS OF THE FEDERAL RULES
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AS APPLIED TO
PATENT INTERFERENCE PROCEEDINGS
In 1952 Congress amended the United States Code regarding
patent interference proceedings. Section 541 of Title 35 referring
to affidavits and depositions was replaced by section 242 concerning subpoenas and witnesses. The following wording was added
concerning patent interference proceedings: "The provisions of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure relating to the attendance of
witnesses and to the production of documents and things shall

apply to contested cases in the Patent Office."8 In interpreting
this wording the courts and the Patent Office have had difficulty
in determining whether parties in a patent interference proceeding may avail themselves of the full benefits of the discovery
provisions of the Federal Rules. 4 The repealed statute allowed
1. The clerk in any court of the United States, for any district or
territory wherein testimony is to be taken for use in any contested
case pending in the Patent Office, shall, upon the application of any
party thereto, or of his agent or attorney, issue a subpoena for
any witness residing or being within such district or territory
authorized to take depositions and affidavits at any time and place
in the subpoena stated. But no witness shall be required to attend
at any place more than forty miles from the place where the
subpoena is served upon him....
2. The clerk of any United States court for the district wherein
testimony is to be taken for use in any contested case in the
Patent Office, shall, upon the application of any party thereto, issue
a subpoena for any witness residing or being within such district,
commanding him to appear and testify before an officer in such
district authorized to take depositions and affidavits, at the
time and place stated in the subpoena. The provisions of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure relating to the attendance of witnesses and to the production of documents and things shall
apply to contested cases in the Patent Office.
3. 35 U.S.C. § 24 [hereinafter referred to as section 24].
4. A patent interference proceeding is the means of determining
which applicant is entitled to a patent when several parties present themselves to the Patent Office as opposing inventors of the same invention.
The applicant who filed the first application is given the position of senior
party and all applicants who filed later are termed junior parties. The
Patent Examiner then assigns the junior parties hearing times in which
they may present evidence in an attempt to prove that they discovered
the invention prior to the time assigned to the senior party. After all
of the junior parties have presented their evidence, the senior party is permitted to rebut the evidence of the junior parties. The Patent Examiner
then decides who is entitled to the patent. It is in these proceedings that
the confusion over the use of discovery provisions has arisen. 35 U.S.C. §
135.

specifically for the use of a subpoena duces tecum which requires
the production of documents for examination and cross-examination of witnesses. The new statute replaced the reference to the
subpoena duces tecum with the above quoted reference to the
Federal Rules. An earlier line of cases under the new statute
holds that the discovery provisions of the Federal Rules are only
available to examine and cross-examine witnesses. More recent
cases hold that the discovery provisions are available for use to
their fullest extent to parties in a patent interference proceeding. This paper will consider which of these views more accurately
reflects the intent of Congress and which is better policy in this
area.
An early decision under the new statute concerning discovery
provisions in patent interference proceedings was Korman v.
Shull,5 which held that if a party could show good cause Rules 26,
30, 34 and 45 were available to him under section 24.6 Shull
attempted to force Korman to produce experimental data which
would prove that specifications in Korman's application did not
produce the patent in question. The court stated that since Shull
had his own laboratory and access to Korman's specifications, he
could prove any inaccuracy experimentally. Therefore, he could
not show the good cause required. The court said, "[T]he law is
well established that the burden is upon Nobile and Schering
Corporation [Shull's assignee] to establish the alleged inoperativeness of the applications for patents by Korman and Hogg and their
assignee, The Upjohn Company."'
In Korman v. Nobile8 the issue of the applicability of discovery
provisios again arose. Nobile attempted to prove that Korman's
specifications would not produce the contested patent. The court
said:
It should be noted that under the above-quoted statute
[35 U.S.C. § 24] only the provisions of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure "relating to the attendance of witnesses
and to the production of documents and things" shall apply in contested cases in the Patent Office. Thus it is clear
that the broad provisions of the rules of civil procedure
relating generally to discovery are not made applicable
to contested cases in the Patent Office.
It should be noted that under the above-quoted statute
a witness may be commanded to appear and testify "before
an officer in such district authorized to take depositions,
and affidavits." That is, the statute provides that the testimony shall be taken before an officer authorized to take
depositions and affidavits, but it does not provide for the
taking of testimony before the court.0
5.

184 F. Supp. 928 (W.D. Mich. 1960).

6.
7.
8.
9.

184
184
133
133

F. Supp.
F. Supp.
U.S.P.Q.
U.S.P.Q.

at 931.
at 934.
178 (1962).
at 179.
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From this statement three conclusions may be drawn: (1) The court
may have changed its view since Korman v. Shull and may have
felt that section 24 does not make any discovery provisions available
to parties in a patent interference proceeding; (2) Even if Rules
26, 30, 34 and 45 are still available, no other discovery provisions
may be used; (3) The evidence gained in this manner is to be
taken before an officer authorized to take depositions and affidavits
rather than to be taken by the court into the record, The court
expressed the policy behind this reasoning by saying:
It is clear that to grant Nobile's present motion for relief would, in effect, open wide the door for any pharmaceutical manufacturing company involved in an interference proceeding in the Patent Office to search and ransack
the documents, records and files of its competitor for secret
and confidential information relative to the work process
and tests conducted by its competitor in the production of
drug compounds. At this point I cite and refer to the opinion of this court in Korman v. Shull and the many authorities therein cited.
The burden is upon Nobile and Schering, assignee, to
establish their claims and contentions in the interference
proceedings in the Patent Office, and there is no burden or
obligation on Upjohn and its employees to assist Nobile and
Schering, assignee, in establishing their claims and contentions in the Patent Office. The law is well established
that Nobile is not entitled to the relief he seeks by his present motion for relief. 10
Even in the light of this passage it is unclear whether the court
intended to approve all of Korman v. Shull including the availability of Rules 26, 30, 34 and 45, or whether it merely intended to
approve the holding that good cause was necessary before an
affidavit or deposition could be taken.
Despite Korman v. Shull and Korman v. Nobile the Patent
Office was still uncertain as to what discovery provisions were
available to parties in an interference proceeding. In Campbell v.
Gilby,n1 Gilby attempted to gain information from Campbell's files
through the use of discovery provisions. The court said:
In so far as Gilby et al.'s opposition is grounded on the
question of whether or not discovery is permitted, no consideration can be given thereto, the Patent Office having

10.
11.

133 U.S.P.Q. at 180.
146 U.S.P.Q. 723 (1965).

no power or authority to supervise the actual taking of
testimony. The determination of the question of whether
or not discovery is permitted under the provisions of 35
U.S.C. § 24 is within1 2 the sole jurisdiction of the United
States District Court.
Gladrow v. Weisz 8 approved Korman v. Shull and clarified
the scope of section 24. Galdrow presented an office memorandum
signed and witnessed to establish his date of conception for the
invention in question. In that memorandum a notebook was mentioned as the actual record of the invention. Weisz attempted to
gain production of that notebook under Rule 34 through an application of section 24. In reference to the scope of section 24 the
court said:
Gladrow urges that is was the legislative intent that
section 24 should make "no important" change in the
procedure authorized by the previous corresponding sections 54, 55 and 56.14 That much may be conceded. It
must be noted, however, that those earlier sections clearly
authorized the district court to require the attendance of
witnesses with documents and to compel the witnesses to
testify. The present order does not extend beyond that

authorization.15
The court also specified that under section 24 use of discovery provisions is limited to examination and cross-examination of witnesses.18 The court explained the proper use of discovery rules
and showing of causation by saying, "[U]pon cross-examination,
Weisz could attack the verity of the office memorandum and of
each of its parts, including the reference to the page or pages of
the notebook. Weisz was not confined to proof of his own date of
invention, but could question that of Gladrow and Parker....
Hogan v. Zletz' 8 indicates complete acceptance of the view
expressed in Gladrow v. Weisz by the Patent Office:
The order in the case will first be to the effect that
this proceeding in this court, brought under 35 U.S.C. §
12. 146 U.S.P.Q. at 725.
13. 354 F.2d 464 (5th Cir. 1965).
14. Section 55 deals with witness fees and section 56 deals with
penalties involved when a witness fails to appear or refuses to testify.
Section 54 may be found supra note 1.
15. 354 F.2d at 467, 468.
16. In the words of the court:
We agree with Korman v. Shull, 184 F. Supp. 928, 934 (W.D.
Mich. 1960), that Rule 34, Fed. R. Civ. Proc. is among the rules
referred to in 35 U.S.C. § 24, when the production of documents is
required for the examination or cross-examination of a witness.
Here the witness, present and being cross-examined, refused
to produce a document in his possession or under his control upon
which he was subject to further cross-examination. Clearly, Rule

34 in connection with 35 U.S.C. § 24 vests authority in the district

court to require the production of the document under those cir-

cumstances.

354 F.2d at 468 (emphasis added).
17. 354 F.2d at 468.
18. 151 U.S.P.Q. 103 (1966).
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24, covers and includes proceedings under Rule 34 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedures. This is to say that
this section of the statute is interpreted to include, not
only deposition type proceedings, but Rule 34 motions and
proceedings. In this connection, the court is following the
Gladrow v. Weisz decision.' 9
From the foregoing decisions it seems that the Patent Office
and the federal court agreed that it was the legislative intention
not to broaden the scope of section 54 when Congress added the
wording: "The provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
relating to the attendance of witnesses and to the production of
documents and things shall apply to contested cases in the Patent
Office. '20 Apparently the conclusion was that Congress intended
discovery provisions to be available to parties in a patent interference proceeding only for the purpose of examination and crossexamination of witnesses. However, a recent series of federal
court decisions stemming from the same litigation has thrown the
issue into confusion.
The first case to suggest a greatly enlarged scope of discovery
for interference proceedings was In re Natta.2' Natta assigned his
patent to Montecatini. DuPont, Zletz and Phillips Petroleum Company were the junior parties. Montecatini was granted the position of senior party on the basis of its Italian patent application
filed June 8, 1954, and was limited in proof to rebuttal of attempts
by junior parties to establish earlier filing dates.2 2 After all of the
parties presented extensive proof to establish their filing dates,
Montecatini moved for production of documents from DuPont's files
under Rule 34 through section 24. The court granted this motion
even though the documents were not to be produced for use in
the examination or cross-examination of a witness.
In reaching its decision the court relied on Gladrow v. Weisz
as well as on the wording of section 24. The court said:
DuPont strongly urges that Gladrow must be strictly
limited to its own facts and that the language, "under these
circumstances" [supra note 16] appearing in the above quotation (referring to a single page of a notebook sought
to be produced . . .) renders it inapplicable to these
facts where the request for production is very sweeping
in its effect. But I cannot agree. There is no suggestion
in the language of Section 24, supra, of an intention to
limit the effect of discovery under Rule 34 and no such in19. 151 U.S.P.Q. at 103.
20. 35 U.S.C. § 24.
21.
22.

259 F. Supp. 922 (D. Del. 1966).
35 U.S.C. § 104, 119.

tention is found in the language of Korman v. Shull, 184
F. Supp. 928 (W.D. Mich. 1960), cited with approval in
Gladrow, where the application was denied on the sole
ground that the moving party failed to show good cause.
Once it is held, as the Fifth Circuit did, correctly I believe,
that Rule 34 may be employed to obtain production, the extent of production, great or small, must be left to the discre23
tion of the District Court upon a showing of good cause.
In its reliance on Korman v. Shull the Natta court overlooked the
qualifying decision of Korman v. Nobile which indicated that discovery provisions should only be used for examination and crossexamination of witnesses. 2 4 Though the court did not overrule
Korman v. Nobile, its holding that discovery provisions may be
used to examine the files of an opposing party in an interference
proceeding would seem contra to that case. 25 Thus, doubt is thrown
on the Natta decision, since it is possible that it misinterpreted
20
prior case law.
Following the first In re Natta decision the Patent Office was
uncertain as to what constituted the good cause required for full
use of discovery provisions.27 The district court explained their
concept of good cause and of the scope of discovery available in
the second In re Natta.28 The basic element which was considered
in establishing good cause in expressed in the following passage:
The fact that documents relevant to one or more of
the issues before the Examiner may exist in the files of
DuPont of which Natta has no knowledge and, of course,
to which it has no other means of access, should,
broadly
29
speaking, furnish good cause under the Rule.
This may be interpreted as meaning that if a party in an interference proceeding can show that an opposing party has infor23. 259 F. Supp. at 924, 925.
24. See discussion supra p. 511.
25. See quote supra p. 512-3.
26. The court said:
Next, DuPont argues that Gladrow is no authority here because
there discovery was granted in a situtaion where a witness was on
the stand and the examining party needed production for the sole
purpose of cross-examining the witness. . . . But it is clear that
the Court was not limiting its holding to the exact facts of the
case for it (1) explicitly approved the use of Rule 34 in connection with the language of 35 U.S.C. § 24 and Rule 34, of course, is
not limited to such circumstances as in Gladrow; and (2) explicitly
approved Korman v. Shull where there was no witness on the
stand at the time, but, rather, the application was under circumstances similar to the case at bar. I am not persuaded to grant
reargument on this ground.
259 F. Supp. at 925. Statement (1) indicates a complete disregard for the
express wording of Gladrow, supra note 16. Statement (2) once again
indicates that the court gave no weight to Korman v. Nobile which was
decided by the same judge who decided Korman v. Shull and which re-

fused to grant discovery.
27.
28.
29.

In re Natta, 264 F. Supp. 734, 735 (D. Del. 1967).
264 F. Supp. 734 (D. Del. 1967).
264 F. Supp. at 737.
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mation in his files which would be useful in the litigation he can
obtain access to all or any part of that opponent's files under Rule
34 through an application of section 24.
The court distinguished Korman v. Shull by stating that
though Natta could show that DuPont's specifications did not produce the contested invention by experiment, they could not reproduce DuPont's files themselves. 30 Granting validity to this
distinction, the court contradicts Korman v. Shull in a later
statement when it states, "There are other reasons which, in the
judgment of the Court, show good cause. Natta has attacked both
of DuPont's applications on the ground that they fail to disclose
a valid invention. The ancillary issues of conception and reduction
to practice are thus presented." '
After establishing to its own satisfaction that Natta had sufficient good cause for (employing the available) discovery provisions the court went on to define the scope of that discovery
which was construed extremely broadly. 32 In its definition of this
scope the district court stated that there was no lawyer-client
privilege in a patent interference proceeding- and furthermore
refused to consider that the lawyer's work product was privileged. The only protection the court left DuPont was expressed
as follows:
[N] o matter even bordering on trade secrets will be
permitted to be revealed. However, the mere fact that
a trade secret might be contained within a document is
not per se a reason to preclude its production, for there is
no true trade secret privilege. .

.

.While DuPont has, at the

Court's request, made some endeavor to delineate its
trade secret objection with particularity, most of the objections still remain very general in nature. It is impossible to determine such objections in vacuo. Accordingly,
when DuPont has assembled the required documents, it
may make a single application for appropriate 84action to
cover material thought to constitute trade secrets.
30. Id.
31. 264 F. Supp. at 738.
32. Natta was given access to all of DuPont's files relating to: (1)
all material concerning any aspect of the invention in question; (2) all
documents prepared by DuPont's attorneys in all actions related to this
interference proceeding including those used in the actions against the
other junior parties; (3) all documents in DuPont's files which refer in
any way to Professor Natta's talks, lectures, discussions, patents, or other
writings; (4) the monthly report of DuPont referring to the broad program
for investigation of catalysts. 264 F. Supp. at 739-741.
33. 264 F. Supp. at 741. This is by no means a settled matter in
patent cases, however, the question will not be further discussed in this
comment.
34. 264 F. Supp. at 742.

Thus, if privileges for trade secrets are allowed, a question which
the court did not answer, DuPont may protect those trade secrets
by presenting them to the court, a process which would be very
time consuming. According to the second Natta case all of this
must be accomplished so an opposing party can use discovery to
find something that "may" help his case.
In Natta v. Zletz, 5 Natta attempted to reach documents in the
files of Standard Oil of Indiana, assignee of Zletz. There the court
made these seemingly ambiguous statements: "We agree with the
... conclusion that absence of a witness on the stand does not
here preclude issuance of a Rule 34 order for the production of
documents. . . Clearly, Rule 34 in connection with section 24
vests authority in the district court to the production of documents."3 6 It is unclear whether this court intended to follow
Gladrow or Natta or whether it intended to adopt a rule somewhere between those decisions.
In an attempt to settle the matter a third In re Natta3 7 was
decided which upheld the decisions of the first two In re Natta
cases, and opened the door to use of discovery provisions through
section 24 even wider. The court said:
This statute [35 U.S.C. § 24] manifests a clear congressional intent to make available to parties to patent interferences the broad discovery provisions of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. . . If Congress has desired to
limit discovery to the type available under Rule 45 (b), it
simply would have pointed to that specific rule instead of
referring generally to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
.. . Definitely the fact that some evidence obtained by discovery may subsequently be held inadmissible by the Patent Office presents no reason to deny discovery. We are
satisfied that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure apply
to this case and are not at all persuaded that the scope of
discovery under these Rules should be governed by the
Patent Office rules relating to admissibility.38
The dissent in this decision was based on the theory that there
was no congressional intention, actual or implied, to change patent
interference proceedings as the majority rule. 89 The dissent extended Gladrow slightly and stated: ". . . that section 24 does
not include the authority to use the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to obtain production of documents which are not admissible
'40
in evidence or needed to examine witnesses.

35.

379 F.2d 615 (7th Cir. 1967).

36. 379 F.2d at 616, 618. Citing Gladrow v. Weisz, 354 F.2d 464, 468
(5th Cir. 1965).
37.
38.

388 F.2d 215 (3d Cir. 1968).
388 F.2d at 217, 219 (emphasis added).

39. 388 F.2d at 221-223.
40. 388 F.2d at 222.
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CONGRESSIONAL INTENT

Congress itself offers little help in interpreting what it intended when it enacted section 24 in 1952. Two statements do
help clarify the situation slightly. In speaking of the proposed
recodification committees of both Houses of Congress issued the
following statement:
Although the principal purpose of the bill is the codification
of Title 35, United States Code, and involves simplification
and clarification of language and arrangement, and elimination of obsolete and redundant provisions, there are a number of changes in substantive law. These will be explained
in some detail in the revision notes keyed to each section
which appearin the appendix of this report.41
In reference to changes made in section 24 both substantive and
otherwise, the House and Senate reports stated:
Three sections of the existing statute [35 U.S.C. §§ 54,
55, 56] are combined with some changes in language and
placed in part 1 since they apply to trade-mark cases
in the Patent Office as well as to patent cases. Reference
to a repealed statute in the first paragraphis replaced by
reference to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and
certainrules are made applicable.4 2
The fact that Congress stated it would "explain in some detail"
any substantive changes to be made in the revision would indicate
that no substantive change allowing full use of discovery provisions
in a patent interference proceeding was intended. It might be
further argued that by saying "certain rules" Congress indicated
an intention not to extend the substantive scope of the old section.
The dissent in the third In re Natta43 decision explains the
apparent congressional intent by stating:
The subpoena duces tecum statute, which was incorporated by the 1922 statute, 44 was repealed by the adoption of the Federal Rules which took place prior to the
1952 recodification of the patent laws. It was quite natural, in recodifying, to replace the reference to the statute
governing the issue of subpoena duces tecum with the following language: ". . . The provisions of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure relating to the attendance of
witnesses and to the production of documents and things
shall apply to contested cases in the Patent Office." When
1952 amendment is considered in conjunction with its stat41.

S. REP. 1979, 82nd CoNG. 2d SEss., 4 (1952); H. REP. 1923, 82nd

CONG. 2d SESS., 5; U.S. Congressional and Administrative News, 2394
(1952)

(emphasis added).

42. 35 U.S.C.A. § 24 (emphasis added).
43.

Case cited note 37 supra.

44. See note 1 supra.

utory antecedent and its particular Congressional history,
I think it reveals an intent to provide only the same power
formerly given the 45
district court under the old subpoena
duces tecum statute.
EFFECT OF THE RECENT FEDERAL COURT DECISIONS

ON PATENT INTERFERENCE PROCDEEDINGS
The three In re Natta decisions, if followed, will greatly change
patent interference proceedings. In a normal interference proceeding it is the burden of the junior parties to go forward with
proof that their filing dates shoud be advanced or that the filing
date of the senior party is invalid. After the junior party has
presented his case it is the burden of the senior party to rebut the
junior party's case by proving that his filing date should not be
advanced. 46 If discovery provisions can be used to dig indiscriminately into an opposing party's files this burden of proof will be
reversed. When a party presents his specifications and is assigned
a filing date, an opposing party can force him to prove every step
of his invention again through the use of discovery provisions
47
according to the Natta cases.
As stated in the third In re Natta, all that is necessary to show
good cause which warrants discovery is that the material in question be pertinent to the patent and that it be in the exclusive control
of the opposing party.48 A provision so broad covers the entire
files of the opposing party and presents a great danger of abuse.
Related trade secrets will also become endangered as shown by
the second In re Natta.49 In addition, interference proceedings will
become considerably longer and valuable court time will be wasted.
CONCLUSION

It was not the intention of Congress to make the broad discovery provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure available
to parties in a patent interference proceeding. The change in
wording which appeared in section 24 was merely an updating
made necessary by the repealing of the statute which was previously
referred to. The interpretation which the Federal Courts have
recently given to section 24 is without basis and causes a dangerous
change in patent interference proceedings. As was stated in
Gladrow v. Weisz, use of discovery provisions should be limited
to examination and cross-eximaination of witnesses.
SAMUEL

A. SCOTT

45. In re Natta, 388 F.2d 215, 221 (3d Cir. 1968) (dissenting opinion).
46.

35 U.S.C. § 135.

47.
48.
49.

See quote supra p.
In re Natta, 388 F.2d 215, 219 (3d Cir. 1968).
See discussion supra p.

